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THE SECOND DIMENSION OF THE SUPREME COURT
JOSHUA B. FISCHMAN* & TONJA JACOBI**
ABSTRACT
Describing the Justices of the Supreme Court as liberals and
conservatives has become so standard and the left-right division
on the Court is considered so entrenched that any deviation from
that pattern is treated with surprise. Attentive Court watchers know
that the Justices are not just politicians in robes, decidingeach case
on a purely ideological basis. Yet the increasingly influential em-
pirical legal studies literature assumes just that that a left-right
ideological dimension fully describes the Supreme Court. We show
that there is a second, more legally-focused dimension of judicial
decision making. A continuum between legalism and pragmatism
also divides the Justices in ways that cut against ideological prefer-
ences. The second dimension is systematic and significant, occurring
in multiple legal areas and in consistent patterns. Seen in this way,
the Justices (and their decisions) can be understood in more complex
terms, not just as ideological flagbearers, but as jurists who regular-
ly have to choose between legal methodology and outcome prefer-
ences. In two dimensions, different patterns of coalitions emerge: in
the second dimension, it is the Chief Justice and Justice Sotomayor,
not Justice Kennedy, who sit at the median of the Court and decide
the balance of power.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
** William G. and Virginia K. Karnes Research Professor of Law, Northwestern Universi-
ty School of Law, t-jacobi@law.northwestern.edu.
1671
1672 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1671
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1673
I. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: ONE DIMENSION OR TWO? . . . 1680
A. The Standard Assumption of a One-Dimensional
Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1680
B. Scalingthe Roberts Court in One and Two
Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1689
II. THE SECOND-DIMENSION CASES IN THE ROBERTS COURT . 1698
A. IdentifyingSecond-Dimension Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1699
B. A Theory of the Second Dimension: Pragmatism Versus
Legalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1709
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1713
2016] THE SECOND DIMENSION OF THE SUPREME COURT 1673
INTRODUCTION
Observers of the Supreme Court have become so accustomed to
viewing it as a political body that they often seem surprised when
the Justices deviate from their typical coalitions. For example, when
the Court decided Williams v. Illinois, a case applying the Confron-
tation Clause to expert testimony involving crime lab reports,1 the
New York Times highlighted the odd-bedfellows coalition of jus-
tices constituting the majority.2 Similarly, when the Court held in
Maryland v. Kingthat the Fourth Amendment permitted police to
take DNA swabs as part of routine booking procedures,3 the Times
pointed out the alignment of justices that scrambled the usual
ideological alliances.4
Williams and King, however, did not feature merely unusual vot-
ing alignments; they featured the same unusual alignment. In both
cases, Justice Breyer joined with four conservatives, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, to form a major-
ity; Justice Scalia joined three of the liberals, Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, in dissent.5 The same divide has also ap-
peared in several other cases. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the
same majority held that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did
not govern adoptions of Native American children when the Native
American parent had never had custody prior to the adoption.6
Maracich v. Spears, a case involving the Drivers Privacy Protection
Act of 1994, divided along the same lines,7 but with a twist: the ma-
jority that opposed constitutional privacy rights in Kingsupported
1. See 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
2. Adam Liptak, No Majority Rationale in Crime Lab Testimony Ruling, N.Y.TIMES (June
18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/us/supreme-court-ruling-on-crime-lab-
testimony-lacks-majority-rationale.html [https://perma.cc/H4R7-JC9W].
3. See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
4. Adam Liptak, Justices Allow DNA Collection After an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2013), http: //www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/us/supreme-court-says-police-can-take-dna-
samples.html [https://perma.cc/4X5J-GVA9].
5. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965; Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556, 2565 (2013).
7. See 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2013).
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statutory privacy rights in Maracich,8 while the dissenters sup-
ported constitutional privacy rights but not statutory ones.9
When such unusual coalitions keep recurring, especially in
cases involving diverse legal issues and policy implications, it is
appropriate to question how unusual they really are. Although most
unusual alignments do not coincide exactly with the divide that
occurred in Williams, King, Adoptive Couple, and Maracich, we find
that many divisions on the Court adhere to a common structure. A
few prior commentators have noted such recurring alignments in
particular doctrinal areas, such as in cases involving the Confronta-
tion Clause,10 the right to a jury trial,11 punitive damages,12 and
search and seizure questions.13 We show that such alignments
transcend particular substantive areas of law. These patterns of
coalitions are not idiosyncratic but rather are evidence of a second
dimension in Supreme Court decision making.
Patterns of coalitions that divide across party lines are only one
sign of a second dimension of Supreme Court decision making.
When cases divide into the so-called unusual alignments, which are
not really so unusual, the rationales that the Justices give also fol-
low a discernible pattern. The Roberts, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito
group often points to pragmatic reasons for its decisions, such as
8. See id. at 2195-96.
9. See id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. See Liptak, supra note 2 (In a series of decisions starting with Crawford v. Wash-
ington in 2004, an odd-bedfellows coalition of justices from the courts conservative and liberal
wings have breathed new but fragile and halting life into the clause.).
11. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2006) ([T]he Sixth Amendment cases are .... the
product of an alliance between Justices that the attitudinalists view as the extreme left and
right of the Court.); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure:
The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183,
194 (2005) (noting the coalition of liberals and conservatives that formed the majority in the
jury trial cases).
12. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million Tobacco Ruling, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/washington/21scotus.html [https://perma.
cc/EFZ3-H7Q6] (It is typical for the courts punitive damages rulings to cut across the usual
ideological lines.).
13. See Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testingand the Divided
Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 186-87 (2013) (The press found the Kinglineup confounding,
but criminal proceduralists who watch the Court could have called it.... It is not left or right
that decided this caseor that decides most criminal procedure cases these days. It is the
classic divide between rules and standards, amplified by a split between skeptics and believ-
ers in the beneficence of unfettered law enforcement.).
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considering individualized fairness, the practical ramifications of its
determinations, and the broad policy goals of lawmakers.14 They
tend to favor balancing tests and broad holdings, rather than rigid
rules that apply regardless of circumstance.15 In contrast, the Scalia,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan wing of the Court typically relies
on more legalistic determinations, prioritizing development of clear
rules, closely tied to the plain meaning of legal sources, adherence
to positive law, and consistency in application, without exceptions
for individual cases.16 When the most natural interpretation of legal
sources conflicts with the most desirable result in a particular case,
the legalists tend to favor the former while the pragmatists favor
the latter.17 The division reflects the trade-off between rule of law
values and individuated fairness. Justice Thomas consistently sided
with the legalists during the early years of the Roberts Court but
has occasionally defected from the legalist coalition in recent Terms,
although sometimes on grounds that are unrelated to the legalism-
pragmatism divide.18 Justice Sotomayor could be considered the
swing vote in the second dimension, a position also occupied by her
predecessor, Justice Souter.19 What emerges from this understand-
ing is a second dimension characterized by division based primarily
on legal methodology.
Although contemporary discourse about the Court often views it
as one-dimensional, this was not always the case; early research in
judicial politics often viewed the Court as multidimensional.20 More
recently,many scholars have again challenged the dominant concep-
tion of the Court as one-dimensional.21 This Article is the first to
14. See infra text accompanying note 150.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 148-50.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See, e.g., Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and VotingBehavior: The 1961 Term
of the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 119 (1963); Glendon
Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 90 (1962); L.L. Thurstone & J.W. Degan, A Factorial Study of the Supreme Court, 37
PROC. NATL ACAD. SCI. 628, 630, 635 (1951).
21. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, The Dimension of the Supreme Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT.
557, 566 (2003) (expressing skepticism that two dimensions are adequate to describe the
decision space of the Rehnquist Court); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous
Justice Rides into the Sunset, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 199, 200 (2007) (The presence of unpre-
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establish empirically the existence, nature, and effect of a second,
methodologically based dimension of decision making on the Su-
preme Court. Most scholars agree that a simple left-right, one-di-
mensional spectrum cannot account for the full considerations of the
nations top judges, but many empirical studies of the judiciary ig-
nore this reality.22 The one-dimensional assumption persists
because (1) it is convenientit makes measuring judicial prefer-
ences easy; (2) even though most scholars agree the assumption is
inapt, due to simple path dependence, it goes unquestioned because
others have done the same; and (3) it has never been clear how to
tell if a second dimension exists. However, the existence of a legally
baseddimension that shapes Supreme Court rulings should come as
little surprise to most Court observers. Although it is common now
for both popular and scholarly accounts of the Supreme Court to de-
picttheJusticesas occupying only a left-right, one-dimensional spec-
trum,23 scholars have long recognized that such a characterization
dictable voting coalitions suggests that Supreme Court Justices decisions may in some cases
be structured along divergent or cross-cutting issue dimensions.); Harry T. Edwards &
Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors
AffectingAppellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1916 (2009) (criticizing the assump-
tion that an individual judges personal views can be modeled on a left-right axis); Joshua
B. Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers?Evidence from Scalingthe Supreme
Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S269, S284-85 (2015) (finding a robust two-
dimensional voting structure on the Roberts Court in criminal cases); Joshua B. Fischman
& David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L.
& POLY 133, 150-54 (2009) (criticizing the assumption that judicial ideology is unidimension-
al); Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Courts Many Median Justices, 106
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 847 (2012) (finding different unidimensional ordering of the Justices in dif-
ferent issue areas); Michael Peress, Small Chamber Ideal Point Estimation, 17 POL. ANALYSIS
276, 285-86 (2009) (estimating ideal points of Supreme Court Justices in two dimensions);
Carolyn Shapiro, CodingComplexity: BringingLaw to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme
Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 501-02 (2009) (arguing that observed unidimensional voting on
the Court is a consequence of coding protocols of the Supreme Court Database); Lawrence
Sirovich, A Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme Court, 100 PROC. NATL
ACAD. SCI. 7432, 7432 (2003) (recognizing the necessity of nine dimensions to describe the
nine-Justice Court).
22. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145
(2002).
23. See, e.g., id.; Aaron Blake, The Supreme Courts Rightward Shift   Or Not (In Two
Charts), WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/
03/26/the-supreme-courts-rightward-shift-or-not-in-two-charts/ [https://perma.cc/2XUW-
KVL6] (The courts five more conservative justices, meanwhile, are clearly [historically]
right-of-center.); Alicia Parlapiano et al., The Roberts Courts Surprising Move Leftward, N.Y.
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does not come close to capturing the full considerations of the na-
tions top judges.24 It is well understood that legal considerations are
also significant determinants of judicial decision making.25 More
specifically, the division between legalism and pragmatism is a well-
established distinction.26 Nevertheless, almost all empirical studies
of the judiciary ignore this reality and assume a simple, one-dimen-
sional model of judicial decision making that captures only ideologi-
cal division. Ignoring what we show to be the significant effect of
legal methodology on judicial decision making leads to unreliable
empirical conclusions and a distorted view of judicial behavior and
the judicial role.
This work in no way denies the contribution of the existing empir-
ical literature that has established the significance of the left-right
first dimension on the Court. That literature represents an im-
portant field that has shown the influence of ideology on judicial
behavior, from nominations27 and choice of cases,28 through to final
decisions,29 opinion writing,30 and coalition formation.31 But hiding
TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/23/upshot/the-roberts-
courts-surprising-move-leftward.html [https://perma.cc/ZV7C-TUXP] (The Supreme Court
under Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has been a conservative court. But even conservative
courts have liberal terms  and the term that ended Monday leaned left.).
24. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
25. As evidenced by judicial interviews, see generally H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE:AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991) (reporting interviews
wherein judges describe using a mixture of legal and pragmatic analysis), as well as first-hand
judicial accounts, see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?(The Same
ThingEverybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40 (1993) (suggesting that precedent
is important for judges, largely as a mechanism for maximizing efficiency, and thus their own
leisure time).
26. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 625 (5th ed. 2014); RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8-13 (2008); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE
PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 206-12 (2007).
27. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Votingon Supreme Court Nominees: A
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (describing how judges strategically vote for
or against a grant of certiorari according to expectations of the ultimate success of the case).
See generally VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND
LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA (2007) (analyzing how litigants respond to
judicial signals about their preferred agendas).
29. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Em-
pirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 770
(2000) (finding that ideology dominates questions of institutional federalism); Rafael Gely &
1678 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1671
in plain sight in all of those studies is an inherent limitation of the
extent to which they can provide a nuanced understanding of ju-
dicial behavior without factoring in a legal dimension of judicial
decision making. We find that, indeed, a large number of cases split
between the liberal and conservative blocs, but many do not.
We also do not deny that Justices sometimes allow their prefer-
ences for particular outcomes to override their methodological
commitments. Some of the first-dimension divides may arise when
legalists disagree about the best interpretation of a legal text or
pragmatists disagree about which consequences are most desirable.
At other times, outcome preferences may simply overwhelm legal
principle.
Furthermore, the differences between legalist and pragmatic
judges are a matter of degree rather than kind; most judges value
adherence to clear rules, and most judges seek to avoid patently
unjust results. For this reason, the second-dimension divisions that
we observe typically arise in close cases in which there is some
ambiguity in the legal sources and a tension between the most
natural interpretation of those sources and the most sensible policy.
In our view, the common characterization of such divisions as un-
usual stems from a highly simplistic conception of judging as a
purely political enterprise. Simply acknowledging the role of inter-
pretive methodology explains a large proportion of these so-called
unusual voting alignments. Whether focusing on coalitions or the
potential tradeoff between ideology and jurisprudence, a two-di-
mensional model yields a far thicker account of Supreme Court
decision making than either dimension standing alone. The second
Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Appli-
cations to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 296 (1990).
30. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME 4-5, 10 (2000); Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal
Clarity: Analyzingthe Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 LAW & SOCY REV. 1027,
1033 (2011).
31. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowingon the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175
(1998) (showing that review of administrative regulations under a deferential Supreme Court
rule varied by composition of the ideology of the bench); Tonja Jacobi, CompetingModels of
Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411
(2009) (showing the tradeoff that exists between maximizing coalition formation and ideal
case outcome determination).
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dimension of judicial decision making that we identify is statistical-
ly significant and substantially meaningful. It accords with what
judges say they do and is consistent with many results in the exist-
ing empirical judicial behavior literature.
Our analysis is based on a simple examination of disagreement
rates among the Justices.32 In Part I, we use metric multidimension-
al scaling to generate two-dimensional maps of the Roberts Court,
in which the distances among the Justices approximate their
disagreement rates.33 Because these maps are generated from dis-
agreement rates among pairs of Justices, they avoid making any
controversial judgment about the ideological or jurisprudential
direction of particular votes. The two-dimensional structure is
highly stable between the 2005-2008 natural Court and the 2010-
2012 natural Court, suggesting that it is a robust phenomenon and
not merely an empirical artifact of a given docket.34 We show that
the Justices disagreement rates are not adequately explained by a
one-dimensional structure. For example, Justice Scalia agrees with
Justice Ginsburg more often than he agrees with Justice Breyer,
and Justice Alito agrees with Justice Breyer more often than he
agrees with Justice Ginsburg. We find that many of the disagree-
ments within each bloc are orthogonal to the disagreements between
the blocs.35 The differences between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
or between Justices Scalia and Alito, are more easily explained by
the second dimension than by the first. Finally, we show that the
second dimension also explains many of the coalitions that cannot
be explained by the first dimension.
In Part II, we develop a method for identifying cases that most
strongly implicate the second dimension. For each nonunanimous
case decided by the Roberts Court, we calculate disorder scores36
for the first and second dimensions, representing the degree of
disorder in the voting alignments in each dimension. We identify a
group of second dimension cases that are highly disordered in the
first dimension but well ordered in the second dimension. We select
32. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
36. Paul H. Edelman et al., MeasuringDeviations from Expected VotingPatterns on Colle-
gial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819, 839 (2008).
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these cases for examination because they most cleanly present a
divide along the second dimension. Unsurprisingly, the second di-
mension cases include many cases involving the Confrontation
Clause, the right to a jury trial, and the Fourth Amendment.37
However, there are also many cases involving statutory interpreta-
tionin both civil and criminal contextsas well as procedure,
punitive damages, and intellectual property. This spread strongly
suggests that the second dimension is not a product of idiosyncratic
judicial views in narrow or particular subject areas; rather, the se-
cond dimension is trans-substantive.
Finally, we present our hypothesis that the second dimension
corresponds to a divide between legalism and pragmatism.38
Acknowledging the inherent ambiguity of these terms, we clarify
how we are using them in describing the second dimension. Our
analysis demonstrates the importance of judicial philosophy and
interpretive method, even in the hard cases that the Court typically
hears. By demonstrating that judicial decision making is not merely
another form of policy making, our Article has important implica-
tions for how we conceive of judging in the separation of powers
political-legal system. This conception has broad theoretical and
practical significance. It is significant for theories of the judicial role
and how legal methodology affects, or arguably constrains, judicial
decision making, including the foundational debates over what
constitutes legitimate sources of law and the relative merit of rules
versus standards. The practical significance of our Article includes
indicating a way ahead for better measurements and predictions of
judicial preferences and case determinations, as well as what advo-
cacy is likely to be more or less effective before the Court.
I. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: ONE DIMENSION OR TWO?
A. The Standard Assumption of a One-Dimensional Supreme
Court
On what basis do judges decide cases? This is the most fundamen-
tal question of law. If, for instance, the old legal realist claim that
37. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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case outcomes depend on what the judge had for breakfast39 is en-
tirely correct, then law plays no role in judicial decisions, and judges
are no different from politicians. At the other extreme, if judges
make determinations entirely free of their own biases or prefer-
ences, could judges be replaced by complex artificial intelligence?40
The question of whether both law and ideology shape judicial de-
cision making, and to what extent, has been extensively debated.41
It is well established that much judicial behavior can be predicted
on the basis of the standard left-right ideological divide,42 and much
public discourse regarding the Supreme Court characterizes the dis-
agreements among the Justices as political43 or even partisan.44
39. This phrase is often used to summarize the views of the legal realists and is often
ascribed to Jerome Frank. See generally JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949) (Franks most famous work); see also O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 3 (Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2005) (1881).
40. See E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 143 (1984) ([L]egal logic generates first approximations, which have
a better than random chance of being tolerable to the community because they are based on
analogies to solutions accepted in the past; external experience then operates to modify those
results which the community cannot accept, thereby transforming the law for the future.); 
G. Sartor & L. Karl Branting, Introduction: Judicial Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 6
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 105, 110 (1998), reprinted in JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE 110 (Giovanni Sartor & Karl Branting eds., 1998) (arguing artificial intel-
ligence will promote uniformity in judging but still maintain judicial discretion). For a similar
argument as applied to lawyers, see John O. McGinnis, Machines v. Lawyers, CITY J., Spring
2014, at 12, 19 ([I]n the Age of Computation, the calculators are gaining on the lawyersat
work and in politics.).
41. Compare, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Makingon the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1370 (1998) (finding judicial decision making is positively affected
by collegial deliberation among judges), with Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding that ideology signif-
icantly influences judicial decisionmaking and judges votes are also greatly affected by the
party affiliation of the other judges on the panel in environmental cases).
42. The attitudinalist literature is vast. For foundational works, see C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947
(1948), and Glendon A. Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of
Political Behavior, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1007 (1958). For more modern applications, see, for
example, LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997), and JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 220 tbl.6.1 (1993)
(finding the attitudinal model correctly predicts 76 percent of cases in search and seizure
context). For an overview of the literature, see Daniel R. Pinello, LinkingParty to Judicial
Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999) (providing an
overview of various empirical legal studies).
43. E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005).
44. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
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Yet there is also widespread recognition that legal doctrine shapes
and structures judicial decision making.45 Most legal scholars and
analysts agree that both law and policy preferences affect judicial
decisions, yet this recognition of dual influences on judges is all but
ignored in empirical studies of the Justices voting behavior. Those
studies almost uniformly rely on one-dimensional ideological map-
pings of the Supreme Court.46 In the standard, entirely ideological
mode in which empiricists assess Supreme Court decision making,
on the Roberts Court, Justice Ginsburg is at the liberal end of the
spectrum,47 Justice Thomas occupies the conservative end,48 and
Justice Kennedy is at the median.49 No allowance is made for the
jurisprudential differences within the left and right blocs, or areas
of commonality between those blocs.
This conventional account of the Court relies on two important
assumptions, which have not been well examined. The first as-
sumption is that a single dimension can adequately characterize the
divisions among the Justices. Of course, this conception does not
mean that the divisions in every case correspond perfectly to this
one-dimensional spectrum; there are inevitably some coalitions that
deviate from the usual left-right split. But according to this account,
such deviations are viewed as idiosyncratic or random, and not as
a form of systematic behavior that could be subject to meaningful
examination.
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court 3 (William & Mary Law Sch. Research Paper No. 09-276,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432111 [https://perma.cc/C7GC-
5HUK].
45. As one scholar concluded: Both quantitative research on decision making and
doctrinal research by historical institutionalists point to ways that legal rules help to struc-
ture decisions. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Behavior and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
2 (May 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://nierworkshop.files.wordpress.com/2013/
04/gw-essay-1.doc [https://perma.cc/7PHG-LUY4]; see also Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J.
Richards, Taking and Testing Jurisprudential Regimes Seriously: A Response to Lax and
Rader, 72 J. POL. 285 (2010).
46. See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and Institutions
for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 434 (2007); Martin & Quinn,
supra note 22, at 145.
47. See Adam Liptak, Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/supreme-court-tacks-left-with-
push-from-disciplined-liberals.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ZS2S-9F9F] (describing Justice
Ginsburg as the senior member of the liberal justices).
48. See infra note 110.
49. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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Second, the conventional account interprets the one-dimensional
array representing the Court as a policy spectrum. To be a liberal
Justice is to support the same policies as a liberal legislator, and
likewise for a conservative Justice.50 Although such claims are wide-
ly repeated, they have surprisingly little foundation. Certainly,
many studies have shown that Republican-appointed judges reach
more conservative outcomes than Democratic-appointed judges.51
Similarly, Justices of the Supreme Court who are labeled as liber-
al are more likely to reach results that would be endorsed by polit-
ical liberals.52 The fact that judicial votes are correlated with policy
outcomes, however, does not show that the Justices are motivated
exclusively by policy preferences.
The reductionist, one-dimensional model of judicial decision
making denies that judges genuinely care about potential cross-
cutting factors, including legal variablessuch as federalism or
legal methodologyand even other potential political factorssuch
as minimalism of decisions for prudential goals. This Article shows
that a second, substantially meaningful dimension of judicial deci-
sion making exists, one that we interpret as essentially legal meth-
odology. In this Section, we set the stage for that analysis by first
describing how almost all empirical studies of the law ignore this
important factor and why this omission leaves something clearly
missing from existing empirical legal analysis.
Recognizing the second dimension is important not just for legal
scholars, but also for advocates appearing before the Court. It is now
common in both the general legal literature53 and the popular
50. See Fischman, supra note 21, at S269-70 (describing how empirical studies and formal
models of the Supreme Court assume a one-dimensional policy space); G. Edward White,
Unpackingthe Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1168-69 (2005) (describing
a universe of commentary whose practitioners agree that Justices are a species of lawmakers
and that constitutional adjudication is a form of policymaking).
51. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11-12 (2006); Pinello, supra note 42, at 243.
52. Cf. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L.REV. 489, 501
(2006) ([T]he median Justice in a multimember Court, simply because he or she is the
median, tends to push the Courts work back to the center.); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 897 (2006)
(noting the decisive influence for the median Justice in federalism cases); Andrew D. Martin
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press54 to focus on the Court median or the swing Justice,
because the Justice who lies in the middle of the Court is essential
to securing a majority.55 In the context of the Roberts Court, that is
usually taken to mean that the outcome favored by Justice Kennedy
will determine the Courts decision in most cases, and so advocates
will craft their briefs as love letters to Justice Kennedy.56 How-
ever, Justice Kennedys vote does not always determine the case
outcome. For instance, in 2011 in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., Justice Kennedy was the sole dissenter over whether will-
ful blindness was enough to establish the requisite knowledge to
find an inducement of violation of a patent.57 Over the last century,
the Court median has in fact quite regularly been excluded from
Court majorities.58 One reason is that the median can dominate only
if there are always four Justices to both his or her left and right; but
if there is a second dimension, who the median is can vary. As we
et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1281-83
(2005) (providing a theoretical demonstration of the power of the median Justice in sex
discrimination cases).
54. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 647, 680 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003))
(After 1962, Brennan was the Warren Courts median Justice; the Rehnquist Courts is either
OConnor or Kennedy .... When the median Justice is Rehnquist or Scalia, then talk of
revolution will be appropriate.) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted); Linda Greenhouse,
Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A11 (A new
dynamic emerged in the courts last term, which ended last week with Justice Kennedy
standing in the middle, all alone. Not only the lawyers, but also the justices themselves, are
now in the business of courting him.); Jacob Dagger, Q & A: The Shape of the Supreme Court,
DUKE MAG. (Jan. 31, 2006), http://dukemagazine.duke.edu/article/q-and-a-the-shape-of-the-
supreme-court [https://perma.cc/Y99E-63JT] (Anthony Kennedy will be the new median
justice, and [he] is significantly to the right of OConnor. (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky)).
55. Cf. DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 18 (1958); Duncan
Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 27-28 (1948).
56. Robert Barnes, Justices Weigh Courts Role in Detainee Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,
2007, at A20 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, describing the briefs in Boumediene v. Bush).
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement said of the 2007 Term, This current court is going to be
about as conservative or about as liberal as Justice Kennedy. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court
to Take on Contentious Cases in New Term, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2007, at A8.
57. See 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2072 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. In over 10 percent of all Supreme Court cases since 1937, median Justices are not in
the majority. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 56 (2008).
In close casesone-vote divisionsmedians are excluded from the majority in about one
quarter of cases. See id. at 58. Three median Justices in the last sixty years voted with the
majority in close cases 50 percent of the time or less while they held the swing vote. See id.
at 60.
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establish below, and as seen in Figures 3 and 5, Justice Kennedy is
the median in the first dimension, but he is in fact an outlier in the
second dimension on the second natural Roberts Court.59 So in cases
such as National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius60
and Kingv. Burwell,61 where factors other than the simple left-right
divide were arguably at playeven if they were prudential consider-
ations such as judicial legitimacy and power, rather than pure legal
methodology concerns62lawyers should not look to sway Justice
Kennedy. NFIB may seem like an exceptional case, but we show
that in the second dimension, as it was in NFIB, the Chief Justice
sits at the median of the Court, along with Justice Souter in the
first natural Roberts Court and Justice Sotomayor in the second.
This pattern occurs across cases and subject matters. When the
second dimension is determinative in cases, advocates who focus on
persuading Justice Kennedy will be focusing on the wrong Justice.
The assumption of one dimensionality, then, is affecting both
scholarship and legal practice, but there is in fact very little empir-
ical evidence, or even much empirical inquiry, into the matter. In
fact, the assumption that the Court is one-dimensional is difficult to
evaluate because there are no established criteria for determining
the dimensionality of a voting body. Although various tests of di-
mensionality have been proposed, they are not widely used and can
generate conflicting results.63 Single dimensionality is simply an
assumption made consistently in the literature. Early measurement
of judicial attitudes was undertaken by political scientists, who
drew on the far more developed literature on Congress, an institu-
tion whose members views can be arguably summarized on one
dimension.64 But models of Congress are not apt for judges: repre-
sentatives and senators have different incentives than judges,
especially federal judges, since the former are single-minded
59. See infra Figures 3 & 5.
60. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
61. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
62. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV.
763, 845 (2013).
63. See Fischman & Law, supra note 21, at 151-52.
64. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HIS-
TORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 5 (1997) (For most of American history, the structure is indeed
one-dimensional .... A second continuum was most important during two periods when the
race issue was central to American politics.).
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seekers of reelection.65 Nonetheless, early empirical scholars also
made that assumption of judges.
In the earliest quantitative study of voting behavior on the U.S.
Supreme Court, C. Herman Pritchett examined the votes of the Jus-
tices from 1939 to 1941, and identified two dominant voting blocs,
which he denoted as liberal and conservative.66 Using disagree-
ments from the Court majority as a crude measure of ideology,
Pritchett mapped the Justices onto a one-dimensional scale with
Justice McReynolds at the right-wing extreme and Justices Black
and Douglas occupying the left-wing extreme.67 Pritchett acknowl-
edged that his use of the term right-wing assumes that the
division of opinion on the Court results from differences of opinion
as to desirable public policy. It assumes that the above scale reflects
relative liberalism and conservatism as those terms are under-
stood by the man in the street.68 Although Pritchett himself
acknowledged the need for further research to validate this assump-
tion,69 these claims that originated as assumptions eventually
evolved into conventional wisdom.
Other early quantitative studies of Supreme Court voting, most
notably that of Glendon Schubert, viewed judicial preferences as
multidimensional. Schubert mapped the Justices along separate
political and economic scales, along with various minor scales.70
But most contemporary work in judicial politics simply assumes
that the Court occupies a one-dimensional policy spectrum. The jus-
tification for this assumption is commonly attributed to two studies.
First, Bernard Grofman and Timothy Brazill used multidimensional
scaling to examine fifteen different natural Courts of the Supreme
Court.71 They found that a one-dimensional model explained 86
65. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974); see also MORRIS
P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 37 (2d ed. 1989).
66. C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion AmongJustices of the U.S. Supreme Court,
1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 895 (1941).
67. See id. at 894.
68. Id. at 895.
69. See id. (This assumption should be checked by an examination of the issues actually
involved in the cases where dissents were filed.).
70. GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963, at 285, 287 (1965).
71. See Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifyingthe Median Justice on the Su-
preme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of Natural Courts 1953-1991, 112
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percent of the variance in the Justices voting behavior, while a two-
dimensional model explained 97 percent of the variance.72 Although
their analysis hardly repudiated the two-dimensional model, they
reported only one-dimensional results, for ease of interpretation
and because it explains so much of the variance in the data.73 Yet
without ever providing a criterion for assessing how much variance
should be explained by a model, Grofman and Brazill ultimately
asserted that the Supreme Court was fundamental[ly] unidi-
mensional[ ].74 Nevertheless, they acknowledged that a second
dimension would provide a more fine-tuned analysis.75
Most modern studies in judicial politics not only assume that the
Court occupies a single dimension, but that this dimension repre-
sents preferences over public policy.76 The attitudinal model, as
characterized by Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth,77 provided the
second core justification for adhering to one dimension. This model
presumes that Justices votes are determined by the facts of the
case juxtaposed against their personal policy preferences.78 Segal
and Spaeth found empirical support for this claim by demonstrating
a correlation of 0.76 between the Justices ideological values, as
measured by newspaper editorials at the time of the Justices confir-
mation votes, and their proportion of liberal votes.79 They claim that
the attitudinal model correctly classifies 77 percent of the Courts
search and seizure decisions from the 1962 to the 1998 Terms.80 But
critics such as Michael Gerhardt81 and Brian Leiter82 have pointed
out that this approach leaves 23 percent of the decisions unex-
plained. And the introduction of a second dimension has been shown
PUB. CHOICE 55, 57 (2002).
72. Id. at 58.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id. at 58.
76. See Fischman, supra note 21, at S271-72.
77. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 52, at 312.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 323.
80. Id. at 316, 319.
81. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1748,
1751 (2003) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 52).
82. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 192 (2007).
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to improve that rate to approximately 85 percent, depending on the
area of law.83
In fact, neither position should be given much weight, as focusing
on percentage explained actually tells us little, because the propor-
tion of outcomes correctly classified is not a rigorous method for
assessing the validity of an empirical model.84 For instance, if we
proposed a model of ovarian cancer that is simply that it never
occurs, it would be 99 percent accurate. If gender was added to that
model, it would increase the accuracy by 0 percent. Obviously, the
former model is useless, despite its high percentage explained rate,
and the latter is a far superior model, despite its lack of increasing
that rate of predicted accuracy. In addition, as the ovarian cancer
example illustrates, the factor used as the first dimension will
greatly affect the relative percentages explained by the first and
second dimensions: if gender was the only factor in predicting ovar-
ian cancer, accuracy would go from 0 percent to 50 percent.
More recent work, including the highly influential ideal point
model of judicial decision making created by Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn, perpetuates the assumption that the Court is one-
dimensional, but there has been little effort to validate this assump-
tion. Martin and Quinn estimated dynamic ideal points of the
Justices in a single dimension by modeling every imaginable combi-
nation of Supreme Court Justices preferences that could explain the
pattern of majority voting and dissenting over their study period of
time, and found the best fit.85 The result looks a lot like common im-
pressions of the Justices on a liberal-conservative scalethe second
natural Roberts Court is, from left to right, Ginsburg, Breyer,
83. Alexandra Dunworth, Joshua Fischman, and Daniel Ho have shown that the increase
in the predictive value of the second dimension, by area of law, is as follows: For libertar-
ianism, the two-dimensional model improves the accuracy of the predictions from 0.76 to 0.85;
for criminal defense, from 0.79 to 0.85; for commerce, from 0.79 to 0.84; and for localism, from
0.81 to 0.85. Alexandra Dunworth et al., Policy Voting: What Amici Tell Us About Law 34
tbl.3 (Oct. 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://dho.stanford.edu/research/amici.html
[https://perma.cc/VHN2-ZG9X].
84. See James J. Heckman & James M. Snyder, Jr., Linear Probability Models of the
Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimatingthe Preferences of Legisla-
tors, 28 RAND J. ECON. S142, S165-66 (1997) ([C]lassification success may be ... a poor guide
for choosing the dimension of a model.).
85. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 22, at 135.
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Sotomayor, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas86and
so Martin-Quinn scores have been interpreted in those terms. But
Martin and Quinn did not claim that they were establishing that
judicial preferences were ideological. They also simply assumed that
one dimension of judicial decision making applied, as others had
before them.87 Martin and Quinn found that their model correctly
classified 76 percent of decisions, relative to 63 percent for a null
model that assumed that all decisions were reversed.88 Although
their results show that a one-dimensional model is informative,
Martin and Quinn did not purport to assess the performance of a
two-dimensional model.
So in summary, an extensive empirical judicial literature simply
assumes that only one dimensiona dimension that represents
ideologyis necessary to explain judicial decision making. Yet there
has never been any solid evidence of that claim, despite the cen-
trality of the question of whether judicial votes simply reflect polit-
ical ideology or whether legal factors such as legal methodology also
significantly shape judicial decision making. Judges answer the
question by regularly insisting that legal methodology is vitally im-
portant in shaping their decisions,89 yet very little scholarship has
attempted to prove, rather than assume away, the answer. In the
next Section, we begin to answer this question.
B. Scalingthe Roberts Court in One and Two Dimensions
In this Section, we first describe how judicial decision making can
be scaled by using the Justices rulings in all cases in a given time
86. See generally Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/
measures.php [https://perma.cc/L3HA-85VY] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
87. Martin & Quinn, supra note 22, at 145 (For our application, however, we restrict our
attention to the unidimensional case. This is an assumption made in nearly all statistical
analyses of Supreme Court behavior.).
88. Id. at 150.
89. Judges regularly profess to be influenced by judicial methodology, including textual-
ism, formalism, purposivism, consequentialism, minimalism, and concerns for judicial role.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
7-8 (2005); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 49-50, 200, 273, 279 (new ed. 2001);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989); Jeffrey
Rosen, BigChief, NEW REPUBLIC (July 13, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/
magazine/104898/john-roberts-supreme-court-aca [https://perma.cc/F4H9-3WG6].
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period to map their positions relative to one another. Then we apply
this method to the Roberts Court. Scaling can be done in one, two,
or more dimensions; we show how more than one set of factors sig-
nificantly impacts the Justices decision-making patterns. We then
show that the second dimension uncovered by the scaling procedure
is robust over time; the second dimension alignment is notably
similar between the 2005-2008 natural Court and the 2010-2012
natural Court. In our analysis of the Roberts Court, we use mul-
tidimensional scaling (MDS), a method for generating graphical
representations that depict dissimilarities among pairs of objects in
a low-dimensional space.90 In some applications, those dissimilari-
ties may represent concrete phenomena, such as physical distances.
Given a matrix of distances between cities, for example, MDS gen-
erates a two-dimensional map of those cities.91 In other applications,
the distances may be more conceptual. In marketing research, for
example, MDS may be used to generate a map of a product mar-
ket, where the distances might represent consumers perceived
dissimilarities among competing products.92
In the context of voting bodies such as courts or legislatures, the
rate of disagreement for each pair of voters provides a natural mea-
sure of dissimilarity. Several prior studies of the Justices voting
behavior have used MDS in this manner to study the Supreme
Court. In one influential study, Grofman and Brazill used MDS to
examine the dimensionality of the Court and to identify the median
Justices in various natural Courts between 1953 and 1991.93 Peter
Hook similarly used MDS to generate maps of the Rehnquist Court
from 1994 until 2003, examining free speech cases as well as all
nonunanimous cases.94 Paul Edelman, David Klein, and Stefanie
Lindquist used MDS to generate one-dimensional ideal points of the
Justices for measuring the degree of disorder in voting coalitions.95
90. See INGWER BORG & PATRICK J.F. GROENEN, MODERN MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 3 (2d ed. 2005).
91. See id. at 19-23.
92. See, e.g., TREVOR F. COX & MICHAEL A.A. COX, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 71-73 (2d
ed. 2000) (mapping brands of breakfast cereals).
93. See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 71, at 55-56.
94. See Peter A. Hook, The Aggregate Harmony Metric and a Statistical and Visual Con-
textualization of the Rehnquist Court: 50 Years of Data, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 254-55
(2007).
95. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court,
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Most recently, one of the co-authors used MDS to scale the Justices
of the Roberts Court with interest groups that frequently file amicus
briefs in criminal justice and business cases,96 finding that the dis-
agreements among the Justices often deviated from the policy
dimensions defined by these interest groups.97
Our analysis begins with a matrix of disagreement rates among
the Justices. The MDS algorithm then generates a map of the Court
in which the distances between pairs of Justices are roughly propor-
tional to their disagreement rates.98 To illustrate how MDS works
in practice, consider four of the Justices: Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia,
and Alito. As we shall explain shortly, these Justices can be viewed
as representing the four corners of the Roberts Court in a two-
dimensional mapping. Table 1 provides all pairwise disagreement
rates among these Justices, taken from all cases from the 2005-2012
Terms in which all four participated. MDS can transform this Table
into a two-dimensional graphical representation, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.
Table 1. Disagreement Rates Among Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Scalia, and Alito (Percent)
Ginsburg Breyer Scalia Alito
Ginsburg 0.0 15.8 40.0 40.5
Breyer 15.8 0.0 40.5 35.4
Scalia 40.0 40.5 0.0 14.3
Alito 40.5 35.4 14.3 0.0
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129, 135 n.10 (2012).
96. See Fischman, supra note 21, at S269, S274.
97. See id. at S282-87.
98. The metric MDS algorithm uses an iterative procedure to find coordinates that
minimize the sum of squared errors between the distances and the true disagreement rates.
See BORG & GROENEN, supra note 90, at 169-97 (describing an algorithm for computing MDS
solution). We implement the MDS algorithm with the mdscale routine in MATLAB, using
the option to minimize the criterion metricstress.
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Figure 1. Two-Dimensional Metric Multidimensional Scaling:
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Alito*
*Disagreement rates indicated in percentages.
The MDS algorithm finds the coordinates that best approximate
the disagreement rates given in Table 1. The fit typically will not be
exact, although it is extremely close in this example. In one sense,
however, the mapping will not be unique, since a rotation or reflec-
tion of Figure 1 would generate a graph with identical distances.
Thus, generating a scaling diagram always requires a decision
regarding how to rotate and reflect the graph. This choice is impor-
tant because the substantive interpretation of the horizontal and
vertical dimensions will necessarily depend on the rotation and
reflection that are chosen. Some applications of MDS present a na-
tural choice for rotation and reflection. For example, if the dissimi-
larities are distances between cities, it is natural to rotate and
reflect the resulting map so that the east-west axis coincides with
the horizontal axis on the graph and the north-south axis coincides
with the vertical axis.
When applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court, there is no
such natural choice for rotation or reflection; the decision necessar-
ily requires subjective judgment. In Figure 1, we have rotated and
reflected the graph so that Scalia is directly to the right of Ginsburg
and Breyer and Alito are above the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. The two-
dimensional structure of the disagreement among these Justices is
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readily apparent. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg each disagree with
Justice Scalia in about 40 percent of cases, but they disagree with
each other around 16 percent of the time.99 Justice Breyer agrees
with Justice Alito substantially more than he agrees with Justice
Scalia, but Justice Ginsburg agrees with Justice Scalia slightly more
than she agrees with Justice Alito.100 Of course, the left-right
disagreements are between two and three times as large as the top-
down disagreements, but we argue below that these top-down
disagreements are both large and meaningful enough that they
should not be dismissed as mere noise.
We now turn to mapping the entire Roberts Court. To contrast
the two-dimensional model with the one-dimensional approaches
that are dominant in the literature, we begin by mapping the Court
in a single dimension. Figure 2 provides a one-dimensional MDS
diagram for the natural Court constituting the 2005-2008 Terms
(the first natural Roberts Court), beginning when Justice Alito
joined the Court and ending with Justice Souters retirement. Fig-
ure 3 provides a similar diagram for the natural Court constituting
the 2010-2012 Terms (the second natural Roberts Court), beginning
when Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens. We made the natural
choice to place the liberal bloc on the left, but there is no need to
choose a rotation for the one-dimensional model.
Figure 2. One-Dimensional MDS Diagram of the Roberts Court,
2005-2008 Terms
99. See supra Table 1.
100. See supra Table 1.
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Figure 3. One-Dimensional MDS Diagram of the Roberts Court,
2010-2012 Terms
These one-dimensional diagrams are consistent with the standard
discourse about divisions among the Justices as well as widely used
one-dimensional estimates of judicial ideology, such as the Martin-
Quinn scores.101 There are important differences, however, between
the MDS coordinates and Martin-Quinn scores. The MDS coordi-
nates are chosen so that the distances in the diagrams approximate
the disagreement rates among the Justices; thus, the distances de-
picted have an intuitive interpretation. In the Martin-Quinn model,
the Justices ideology scores are depicted in a nonlinear scale, so the
distances among the Justices do not have an intuitive interpreta-
tion.102
It should not be surprising that the one-dimensional mapping
fails to provide a perfect fit with the Justices disagreement rates.
Comparing the distances in Figures 2 and 3 with the actual
disagreement rates in Table 1 reveals the limitations of the one-
dimensional model. For example, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are
depicted as being roughly 0.1 apart in Figure 2, whereas they actu-
ally disagree 16 percent of the time.103 Justices Scalia and Alito are
roughly 0.05 apart in Figure 2 (and even less in Figure 3), although
they disagree 14 percent of the time.104
Figure 4 provides a two-dimensional MDS diagram for the first
natural Roberts Court, beginning when Justice Alito joined the
Court and ending with Justice Souters retirement. As in Figure 1,
we rotate and reflect the graph so that Justices Ginsburg and Scalia
101. See generally Martin & Quinn, supra note 22.
102. See Fischman & Law, supra note 21, at 188-89 ([T]he Martin-Quinn ... ideology scores
are reported on numerical scales that have no natural interpretation.).
103. Compare supra Figure 2, with supra Table 1.
104. Compare supra Figure 2, and supra Figure 3, with supra Table 1.
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constitute the left-right axis and Justices Breyer and Alito are
placed above Ginsburg and Scalia. Without additional interpreta-
tion, which we provide in Part II, we can view the horizontal axis
derived from this rotation as capturing the degree to which Justices
are Ginsburg-like versus Scalia-like.105 The vertical axis could be
understood as capturing the component of being Breyer-like or
Alito-like that is orthogonal to the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. These
terms, of course, are not self-defining; they are only meaningful to
the extent that we have a substantive understanding of these Jus-
tices ideological or philosophical inclinations.106 Of course, most
American lawyers would recognize that the Ginsburg-Scalia axis
corresponds closely to the familiar left-right divide among the Jus-
tices.107 However, we suspect that many observers of the current
Court would have greater difficulty articulating the meaning of a
Breyer-Ginsburg axis or a Scalia-Alito axis.
The standard left-right divide is evident in Figure 4, but there is
also a visible top-down divide. Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thom-
as are positioned at one end of the vertical dimension, while Justices
Stevens, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito occupy the opposing end. In the
top-down dimension, Justices Souter and Roberts appear to be the
swing voters. As expected, there is a clear horizontal divide between
the liberal bloc and the conservative bloc. There are substantial
disagreements within each bloc, however, which are largely
orthogonal to the disagreements between the blocs. Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer, for example, are mostly separated along the
vertical dimension, despite Justice Breyers reputation as being the
more moderate liberal Justice.108 Similarly, Justices Scalia and
105. See Fischman & Law, supra note 21, at 162-63 (describing agnostic coding models
in which liberalism and conservatism are defined by reference to agreement with Justices
designated as liberal or conservative).
106. Cf. id. at 163 (One could conceive of the ideological spectrum of Canadian justices as
ranging from LHeureux-Dubé-like to Sopinka-like. However, for readers who are unfamiliar
with Canadian constitutional law ... such an ideological scale may prove less than intuitive.)
(footnote omitted).
107. A less arbitrary approach would have been to rotate the mapping so that the centroids
of liberal and conservative blocs defined the horizontal axis. This would have generated a vir-
tually identical solution. We defined the dimensions by reference to Ginsburg and Scalia for
ease of explanation.
108. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift AmongSupreme Court Justices: Who,
When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1519 (2007) (describing Justice Breyer
as the most moderate member of the Courts liberal wing); Richard A. Posner, Justice
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Alito are primarily separated along the vertical dimension. Justices
Scalia and Kennedy differ along both dimensions, but the vertical
disagreement predominates over the horizontal disagreement, de-
spite Justice Kennedys reputation as a moderate109 and Justice
Scalias reputation as an extreme conservative.110
Figure 4. Two-Dimensional MDS Diagram of the Roberts Court,
2005-2008 Terms
Figure 5 provides an MDS diagram for the 2010-2012 Terms,
starting when Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens. Aside from
the change in composition of the Court, the overall structure of the
voting alignments is extremely stable between Figures 4 and 5.
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito are still diametrically opposed
to Justices Ginsburg and Scalia in the top-down dimension. Justice
Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1699 (2006) (reviewing BREYER, supra
note 89) (describing Justice Breyer as a moderate liberal).
109. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 834 (2006) (describing Justice
Kennedy as a moderate, along with Justices Souter and OConnor); Ernest Young, Rediscover-
ingConservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV.
619, 715 (1994) (same).
110. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 5 (2007) (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as occupying
the Courts extreme right edge); Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 1528-29 (describing Jus-
tice Scalia as an extreme conservative who has grown more extreme with time).
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Roberts still appears as a moderate in the vertical dimension, al-
though marginally closer to the Breyer-Kennedy-Alito camp. Justice
Sotomayor is a strikingly close substitute for Justice Souter in both
dimensions, placing her as a second-dimension moderate. The re-
placement of Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan represents a moder-
ate move toward the center in the left-right dimension, but also a
larger vertical move toward the Ginsburg-Scalia camp. The most
difficult Justice to explain, surprisingly, is Justice Thomas, who
appears to have drifted away from Justice Scalia and toward Justice
Alito. It may be premature to interpret this vertical change as evi-
dence of a philosophical shift on the part of Justice Thomas, but an
examination of future Terms could clarify if this drift is enduring.
Figure 5. Two-Dimensional MDS Diagram of the Roberts Court,
2010-2012 Terms
It is well known that a two-dimensional model of the Supreme
Court provides a better fit than a one-dimensional model;111 indeed,
more dimensions always guarantee a better fit to the data.112 The
111. See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 71, at 58 (reporting mean r-squared values of 0.86
for one-dimensional MDS and 0.97 for two-dimensional MDS for natural Courts of the Su-
preme Court from 1953 to 1991).
112. See J.B. Kruskal, Multidimensional Scalingby OptimizingGoodness of Fit to a Non-
metric Hypothesis, 29 PSYCHOMETRIKA 1, 16 (1964) (observing that stress always decreases
as the number of dimensions increases).
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stability of the two-dimensional structure between the two natural
Courts suggests that this structure is robust across time. In the one-
dimensional model, Justices Alito and Scalia appear to have
switched places on the ideological spectrum between the two natural
Courts. In the two-dimensional model, their relative positions are
in fact quite stable, suggesting that the perceived drift in the one-
dimensional model may be illusory. Disagreements that do not fall
along the left-right dimension should not be dismissed as mere
noise; they are based on recurring coalitions that are susceptible to
meaningful explanation. As we discuss below, the second dimension
also reveals useful insights about Supreme Court decision making
that would be lost in a one-dimensional model.
In the two-dimensional model, it looks as if Justice Breyer is in
fact not more moderate than the other liberals, as appears in the
one-dimensional model. But we cannot safely conclude that Justice
Breyer is definitively not more liberal than Justices Sotomayor,
Kagan, and Ginsburgthat conclusion depends on the specific rota-
tion chosen, as discussed above. This understanding illustrates that
some of the orthodoxies about judicial positioning that are drawn
from the one-dimensional model may in fact be products of the as-
sumptions of one dimensionality, rather than of actual, manifested
judicial preferences.
The figures presented above demonstrate that a simple mapping
of disagreement rates reveals a clear two-dimensional voting struc-
ture on the Supreme Court. The two-dimensional model explains
substantially more variance in voting behavior than the one-dimen-
sional model. Moreover, the two-dimensional structure is noticeably
robust across different natural Courts. The challenge, which we
pursue in the following Part, is to demonstrate that the second di-
mension has a meaningful interpretation and that understanding
the second-dimension divide can enrich our understanding of the
Court.
II. THE SECOND-DIMENSION CASES IN THE ROBERTS COURT
In Part II.A, we describe our methodology for identifying the sec-
ond-dimension cases. Using voting data from 688 cases decided on
the merits during the 2005-2012 Terms, we identify 29 cases that
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most directly implicate the second dimension. In Part II.B, we pre-
sent our hypothesis that the second dimension we have uncovered
generally tracks the divide between pragmatism and legalism.
A. IdentifyingSecond-Dimension Cases
The scaling diagrams of the Roberts Court shown in Figures 4
and 5 reveal a two-dimensional structure, but they do not explain
what these dimensions represent. To explore what these dimensions
capture, we search for cases that are highly disordered along the
first dimension but well ordered along the second dimension. We
select for disorder in the first dimension so as to exclude the kinds
of policy- or value-based considerations that often characterize left-
right splits.
We measure disorder using a procedure developed by Paul Edel-
man, David Klein, and Stefanie Lindquist to quantify the degree of
disorder in Supreme Court coalitions.113 When a vote is perfectly
ordered in one dimension, there exists a cutpoint that cleanly sep-
arates the majority coalition from the Justices in dissent.114 In the
one-dimension diagrams shown in Figures 2 and 3, for example, a
cutpoint placed at 0.2 would perfectly separate the liberal bloc from
the conservative bloc. All cases that are divided by a 5-4 split
between these two blocs would thus be perfectly ordered. When an
alignment is disordered, no such cutpoint exists. Some of the
Justices would have to travel along the spectrum in order for the
coalition to be properly ordered. The disorder measure for each case
is determined by the amount of travel that must occur for the voting
alignment to be ordered.
For example, in Alleyne v. United States, Justice Thomas joined
the four liberals to form a majority.115 Alleyne is a disordered vote
since there is no cutpoint in the one-dimensional spectrum that
separates the majority and dissenting coalitions. The disorder score
is determined by the cutpoint that minimizes the amount of travel
necessary to achieve separation of the coalitions. In Alleyne, this
would occur with a cutpoint to the left of Justice Kennedy.
113. See Edelman et al., supra note 36, at 821-28.
114. See id. at 822.
115. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
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The procedure developed by Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist was
designed to measure disorder in a single dimension, but it can easily
be applied to two dimensions by examining disorder in each dimen-
sion separately. In addition, we use a simplified version of their
disorder formula. If various Justices have to travel distances of
in order for the vote to be ordered with respect to ax x j1 , ,
proposed cutpoint, we define the disorder as . The dis-x x j1
order score for each case is determined by the cutpoint that
minimizes the total disorder.116
To measure disorder in two dimensions for the entire period of the
Roberts Court, we use MDS to generate coordinates for all eleven
Justices who served on the Roberts Court during the 2005-2012
Terms, which are displayed in Table 2.117 We analyze these Terms
together so that we can include the 2009 Term, which featured a
distinct natural Court, and also to avoid the yearly fluctuations that
would arise if we analyzed each Term separately.118 We use these
coordinates to measure disorder in both dimensions. As before, Jus-
tice Ginsburg is normalized to have zero coordinates in both
dimensions, while Justice Scalia is normalized to zero in the second
dimension. The range among the Justices is 0.5 in the first dimen-
sion, from Justice Stevens on the left to Justice Thomas on the
right. The range in the second dimension is 0.19, from Justices
Ginsburg and Scalia on the bottom, to Justice Kennedy on the top.
116. Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist measure disorder using the formula .x x j1
2 2
See Edelman et al., supra note 36, at 825. Their formula has appealing mathematical foun-
dations but is somewhat less intuitive. The disorder rankings for the cases are quite similar
using either measure.
117. We use weighted MDS, where each pair of Justices is weighted by the number of cases
in which both Justices participated.
118. Analyzing Terms separately might yield more accurate results when there is ideolog-
ical drift among the Justices that would be obscured when analyzing the aggregate voting
data. Given that we do not find strong evidence of drift between the 2005-2008 Terms and the
2010-2012 Terms, we feel more comfortable analyzing all the Terms together.
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Table 2. Two-Dimensional MDS Coordinates for the Justices of






Stevens -0.074 Scalia 0.000
Souter -0.025 Ginsburg 0.000
Ginsburg 0.000 Thomas 0.041
Kagan 0.016 Kagan 0.052
Sotomayor 0.032 Souter 0.069
Breyer 0.034 Sotomayor 0.082
Kennedy 0.265 Roberts 0.099
Roberts 0.338 Stevens 0.147
Scalia 0.373 Alito 0.153
Alito 0.389 Breyer 0.185
Thomas 0.426 Kennedy 0.193
To illustrate our method for calculating voting disorder, consider
the voting alignment in Williams v. Illinois, in which the majority
consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito.119 Figure 6 depicts the voting alignment, with
the majority Justices represented as solid squares and the dissent-
ing Justices as hollow squares. The vertical line represents a poten-
tial cutline separating the coalitions. It is evident that the voting is
disordered in the left-right dimension. With the cutline depicted,
Justices Breyer and Scalia must both travel in the horizontal direc-
tion to be on the appropriate side of the cutline. Since Justices
Breyer and Scalia have first-dimension coordinates of 0.034 and
0.373, respectively,120 they must travel a total distance of 0.339 to
both be on the correct side of the cutline. Note that any vertical cut-
line separating the liberal and conservative blocs will yield the same
result, which minimizes the total amount of travel to achieve perfect
119. 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
120. See supra Table 2.
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ordering in the first dimension.121 Thus, the first-dimension disorder
score for Williams is 0.339.
Figure 6. Voting Alignment in Williams v. Illinois, with
Vertical Cutline
Figure 7 shows the alignment in Williams, but with a horizontal
cutline. The alignment is also slightly disordered in the second
dimension, because Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are each on the
wrong side of the horizontal cutline. Williams is much less disor-
dered, however, in the second dimension. Justices Thomas and
Sotomayor need to travel shorter distances in order to move to the
correct side of the horizontal cutline than Justices Breyer and Scalia
did with the vertical cutline.122 The second-dimension coordinates
for Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are 0.041 and 0.082, respec-
tively,123 so they must travel a combined distance of 0.041 in order
to be correctly positioned with respect to the cutline. Because this
cutline minimizes the total amount of travel, the second-dimension
disorder score for Williams is 0.041, which is significantly less than
the first-dimension disorder score. Intuitively, this suggests that in
Williams, the second dimension is far more salient in explaining the
divisions on the Court than the first dimension is.
121. In this example, any vertical cutline that separates the liberal bloc and the conserv-
ative bloc will generate the minimum disorder score.
122. See supra Figure 6.
123. See supra Table 2.
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Figure 7. Voting Alignment in Williams v. Illinois, with
Horizontal Cutline
By repeating this procedure for every case during our period of
study of the Roberts Court, we can derive disorder scores in both
dimensions for each case. Figure 8 provides a scatter plot of these
disorder scores for all nonunanimous cases decided by the Roberts
Court. Disorder scores are generally larger in the first dimension,
just as the distances among the Justices are larger in the first di-
mension. One-half of the nonunanimous cases are perfectly ordered
in the first dimension. To identify cases that best exemplify the se-
cond-dimension divide, we select cases with high disorder scores in
the first dimension but low disorder scores in the second dimension.
Specifically, we select cases with first-dimension disorder scores of
at least 0.3 and second-dimension disorder scores of at most 0.1.
Although these thresholds are admittedly arbitrary, we chose them
to conform to media and academic commentary about disordered
voting. Cases such as Williams and King, for example, were de-
scribed as disordered in the media124 and have first-dimension
disorder scores of 0.34. The cases meeting our criteria for disorder
scores are listed in Table 3.
Unsurprisingly, many of the areas of case law known for generat-
ing unusual alignments are well represented among these second-
dimension cases. Five of the second-dimension cases we identify
involve the Confrontation Clause,125 and three involve the Sixth
124. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
125. Those cases are: Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexi-
co, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Mass-
achusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
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Amendment right to a jury trial.126 The Justices also divided along
the second dimension in three cases involving the Fourth Amend-
ment.127 There are four cases involving procedural or jurisdictional
issues arising out of civil litigation128 and two involving statutory
criminal procedure.129 Finally, many of the second-dimension cases
involve issues of statutory interpretation, including four arising out
of civil litigation130 and four involving criminal statutes.131
126. Those cases are: S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012); Oregon v. Ice,
555 U.S. 160 (2009); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
127. Those cases are: Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409 (2013); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
128. Those cases are: Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393
(2010) (applicability of state statute regulating class actions in federal diversity case); Vaden
v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (Federal Arbitration Act); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008) (Federal Arbitration Act); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) (federal question jurisdiction).
129. Those cases are: Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (Speedy Trial Act);
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (power of circuit court to correct sentencing
errors absent cross-appeal).
130. Those cases are: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Indian Child
Welfare Act); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dept of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011) (Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230
(2009) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept of
Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (federal Impact Aid Act).
131. Those cases are: Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012) (Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Notification Act); Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (Armed Career
Criminal Act); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (federal money laundering
statute); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (Armed Career Criminal Act).
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Figure 8. Disorder Scores in Two Dimensions for Nonunanimous
Cases, 2005-2012 Terms*
* Points are jittered so that cases with identical disorder scores are visible as clusters. The
list of second-dimension cases is determined by the lower-right quadrant.
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Table 3: List of Second-Dimension Cases*
List of Second-Dimension Cases, 2005-2008 Terms
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X X X X X 0.5 0.05





X X X X X 0.5 0.05

















X X X X X X 0.41 0.07





X X X X X X 0.32 0.01
2007 Giles v.California X X X X X X 0.32 0.01
*Justices in the majority are indicated with an X.
List of Second-Dimension Cases, 2009 Term









































X X X X X 0.73 0.10
2009 Bloate v.United States X X X X X X X 0.39 0.04
*Justices in the majority are indicated with an X.
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List of Second-Dimension Cases, 2010-2012 Terms














































X X X X X X 0.5 0
2012 Florida v.Jardines X X X X X 0.5 0












X X X X X X X 0.36 0





X X X X X X 0.34 0.01
2011 Williams v.Illinois X X X X X 0.34 0.04
2012 Maryland v.King X X X X X 0.34 0.04





X X X X X 0.34 0.04
*Justices in the majority are indicated with an X. Justice Kagan did not participate in cases
denoted by a dash.
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B. A Theory of the Second Dimension: Pragmatism Versus
Legalism
Although Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the existence of a second
dimension on the Roberts Court, they do not reveal what this second
dimension represents. As we have defined it, the second dimension
is the axis orthogonal to the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. In a crude way,
the second dimension captures the difference between Justices
Scalia and Alito or the difference between Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. In this Section, we observe that many of the second dimen-
sion cases reflect a divide between pragmatism and legalism.
According to Judge Richard Posner:
Legalism [is] a positive theory of judicial behavior ... [that] hy-
pothesizes that judicial decisions are determined by the law,
conceived of as a body of preexisting rules found stated in canon-
ical legal materials, such as constitutional and statutory texts
and previous decisions of the same or a higher court, or deriva-
ble from those materials by logical operations.132
In contrast, Posner describes pragmatism as basing a judicial deci-
sion on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than on the
language of a statute or of a case, or more generally on a preexisting
rule.133
Divides often arise between legalists and pragmatists in cases
involving the breadth of a legal rule. Legalists generally prefer cate-
gorical application of rules, even in situations where the background
justifications of the rule apply weakly, or not at all. On the other
hand, pragmatists prefer to apply rules narrowly, especially in set-
tings where the application of a rule might conflict with its purpose.
Thus, pragmatists favor balancing tests and particularized rules,
which provide judges greater discretion to achieve fair results in
individual cases.
The second kind of consideration involves conflicts between legal
texts and extratextual considerations such as policy, efficiency, or
morality. Legalists are more concerned with reaching the decision
that is best justified by official legal sources, even if such a holding
132. POSNER, supra note 26, at 41.
133. Id. at 40.
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might create bad policy or an unjust result in the individual case.
Pragmatists, on the other hand, are less inclined to view legal texts
as decisive and are more concerned about reaching fair and sensible
results.
The connection between the second dimension and the legalism-
pragmatism divide is well known in cases involving the Confronta-
tion Clause and the jury trial right of the Sixth Amendment.134 The
Confrontation Clause cases on our list followed the Rehnquist
Courts 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, which replaced
the Courts prior balancing approach with a categorical rule requir-
ing that all testimonial statements in criminal trials be subject to
cross-examination.135 However, the Court in Crawford left open the
question of what constitutes testimonial.136 Instead of defining that
key term, the Court merely described a number of broad categories
structured around the primary purpose of the statement at the time
of its utterance and whether the circumstances of the utterance
suggested its likely future relevance in a criminal prosecution.137
This approach left open many questions for later cases.138
The questions raised in our second-dimension Confrontation
Clause cases fall into two broad categories: whether the definition
of testimony extends to statements made by technicians reports
when the individual technician is not available to testify,139 and
134. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 1045-47; Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedys Sixth
Amendment Pragmatism, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 211, 211-14, 216-17 (2013); Bibas, supra note
11, at 184, 199-201; Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1495 (2006).
135. See 541 U.S. 36, 67-69 (2004).
136. See id. at 68.
137. See id. at 51-52, 68.
138. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POLY 791, 795 (2007) ([Crawford has] raised as many
questions as it has answered.); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Confrontation and the Re-Privatiza-
tion of Domestic Violence, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 32, 32 (2014), http://michigan
lawreview.org/confrontation-and-the-re-privatization-of-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/
7YKB-JDG9] (A sound articulation of the meaning of testimonial, which Crawford intro-
duced but failed adequately to define, continues to elude the Court, and lower courts have
struggled to implement the testimonial concept.) (footnote omitted).
139. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227-28 (2012) (testimony of an outside expert
who is qualified to interpret such a report but was not involved in its creation); Bullcoming
v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011) (testimony of the supervisor of such a technician,
when the supervisor did not observe the testing process); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009) (regarding technicians reports analyzing tests on samples).
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whether the definition includes prior victim statements when the
victim is unavailable.140 Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Souter, and Soto-
mayor applied a categorical approach to the Confrontation Clause
in all of these cases in which they participated; Justices Breyer and
Kennedy favored a balancing approach in all of the cases; and Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito favored balancing in four out of
five of the cases.141
The second-dimension divide is also familiar in cases involving
the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, for example, concerned
a criminal suspect objecting to a suspicionless DNA swab taken as
part of the routine booking procedure.142 A majority consisting of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and
Alito upheld the search, while Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan dissented.143 As Erin Murphy observed following the
Courts recent decision in King:
The press found the Kinglineup confounding, but criminal pro-
ceduralists who watch the Court could have called it. Generally
speaking, the dissenters believe in the warrant requirement....
The majority, in contrast, believes in the government. They
believe in reasonableness and free-form balancing as the
Fourth Amendments anchors, not something as rigid as suspi-
cion or a warrant.... It is not left or right that decided this case
or that decides most criminal procedure cases these days. It is
the classic divide between rules and standards, amplified by a
split between skeptics and believers in the beneficence of unfet-
tered law enforcement.144
However, one of our Fourth Amendment cases, Arizona v. Gant,
raises challenging questions about the interpretation of the second
dimension as implicating a divide between legalism and pragma-
tism.145 In Gant, the Court considered whether police can search a
vehicle incident to arrest when a defendant is handcuffed in the
140. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011) (victim statements made at the
scene of the crime when the accused is still at large); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357
(2008) (victim unavailable due to a murder allegedly committed by the accused).
141. See supra notes 139-40.
142. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965-66 (2013).
143. Id. at 1965-66, 1980.
144. Murphy, supra note 13, at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
145. See generally 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
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back of the locked patrol car.146 Under a broad reading of prior pre-
cedent, such a search was permitted because the area within one
lunge of the place of an arrest was deemed to be presumptively
within an arrestees immediate control.147 Justice Stevens, joined by
a mostly legalist coalition consisting of Justices Ginsburg, Souter,
Scalia, and Thomas, rejected this broad reading, holding that the
search was impermissible because the defendant was not physically
capable of accessing his car at the time of the search, and police
could not reasonably have believed the contrary.148 Thus, the legalist
coalition rejected a broad reading of the prior rule in order to avoid
untether[ing] the rule from [its] justifications.149 The dissenting
pragmatists, by contrast, criticized the majority for abandoning a
clear rule, arguing that the majoritys new test was virtually cer-
tain to confuse law enforcement officers and judges for some time to
come.150
Although a detailed examination of the statutory second-dimen-
sion cases is beyond the scope of this Article, the Courts recent deci-
sion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl provides a useful illustration.151
In Adoptive Couple, the Court held that the ICWA, which ordinarily
governs state custody proceedings involving Native American chil-
dren, did not apply to a girl who had never been in the custody of
her Native American father.152 Justice Alitowriting for the same
pragmatist majority as in King emphasized various facts that were
not germane to the statutory text, such as the girls remote biologi-
cal connection to the Cherokee tribe and the biological fathers
failure to support the mother during pregnancy.153 The dissent, by
146. See id. at 335.
147. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (applying a broader assumption
specifically to automobiles that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m] (quoting
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)) (alteration in original)); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763, 768 (1969) (allowing searches of the area into which an arrestee might
reach).
148. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 344.
149. See id. at 343.
150. Id. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
151. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
152. See id. at 2557.
153. See id. at 2556, 2564-65.
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contrast, criticized the majority for adopt[ing] a reading of ICWA
that is contrary to both its text and its stated purpose.154
CONCLUSION
In cases that divide along the second dimension, whatever the
subject matter, it is easy to criticize the position of judges on each
side of an issue as either twisting the law to achieve a desired out-
come or as being insensitive to injustice or even to perverse effects.
But when thought of in methodological rather than simple policy
terms, these two broad camps capture the divide between pragma-
tists and legalists. That division can be thought of as a disagree-
ment over which type of error is better to make in legal analysis:
providing too much discretion to judges to choose outcomes accord-
ing to their policy preferences, on one hand, or giving too little
consideration of the justice meted out to individual parties, on the
other. That debate underlies many of the high-level jurisprudential
disputes that play out in appellate courts and legal scholarship
over the relative merits of rules versus standards, over what sources
of law are legitimate, and over the role of judges and the ideal level
of judicial discretion. Given this widespread impact, it is not sur-
prising that we find that the second dimension arises in a variety of
subject areas, from civil and criminal statutory interpretation cases,
to constitutional criminal procedure cases, to administrative law
cases, and many others.
There are a number of reasons to think that our methods may
actually be understating the significance of the second dimension.
First, in our data analysis, we treat all votes for a majority position
the same, without taking account of concurrences; but as we saw in
our doctrinal analysis, many concurrences, when considered quali-
tatively, could be recategorized between pragmatism and legalism.
As such, our empirical tests utilize a noisy measure of second
dimensionality and, thus, constitute a conservative assessment of
the strength of the second dimension. Second, because we look at
only the U.S. Supreme Court, we are arguably undertaking the
hardest test for the power of the second dimension. An extensive
154. Id. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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literature,155 as well as accounts of judges themselves,156 suggest
that legal methodology is more important for the lower courts, both
because the Supreme Court tends to take the most highly salient
political cases and because lower courts face oversight for failure to
follow Supreme Court precedent. A similar argument has been
made that the U.S. Supreme Court is comparatively more policy-
oriented than supreme and constitutional courts in other Western
nations.157 Thus, the fact that we find that a second dimension
significantly shapes U.S. Supreme Court decisions suggests that the
methodological dimension may be even clearer when analyzed in
other contexts.
Accordingly, the second dimension needs to be taken seriously in
a variety of arenas. For advocates, our results suggest that the pop-
ular medias idea that every argument made before the current
Court should be directed at persuading Justice Kennedy may be
misidentifying the median in multiple relevant areas. Additionally,
in some cases it may be easier to change a Justices vote in the se-
cond dimension than the first,158 particularly in highly salient polit-
ical cases. For scholars, our results raise significant challenges for
how empirical legal studies should measure judicial preferences. In
addition, the second dimension raises important questions about
some of the empirical claims made in that literature. For instance,
the claim that all but one Justice in the post-1930s era have
drifted in their political preferences over time159 may simply be a
155. See Frank Cross et al., A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that [l]egal obedience
... appears to be a much stronger constraint on lower courts than higher courts, as expected
given the nature of judicial hierarchy). 
156. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 25, at 40 (arguing that legal doctrine provides an impor-
tant time-saving heuristic for lower court judges).
157. See Michel Rosenfeld, ComparingConstitutional Review by the European Court of Jus-
tice and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INTL J. CONST. L. 618, 627, 630, 632-34, 645, 648 (2006)
(describing how the European Court of Justice is more vulnerable to external pressure than
the U.S. Supreme Court). The German Federal Constitutional Court hears, on average, less
than three major constitutional issues per year. David Fontana, Docket Control and the Suc-
cess of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 627 (Tom Ginsburg
& Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
158. Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: UsingFeder-
alism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DUKE L.J. 183, 186 (2009) (show-
ing how, in a significant number of cases, dissenting Justices are able to use federal-state
division to split substantive coalitions and craft subsequent majority coalitions).
159. See Epstein et al., supra note 108, at 1486.
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result of a failure to measure judicial preferences in two dimensions.
Because the second dimension is largely orthogonal to the first di-
mension, Justices will at times have to choose between the way they
want to decide a case ideologically versus methodologically. This
understanding illustrates just one of the significant implications of
this Article having rigorously established the existence of the second
dimension: the suggestion that judicial preferences are so variable
and weakly anchored that every single Justicebar onehas signif-
icantly changed his or her view while on the nations highest Court
provides a very different conception of judging than our view of
judges as, rather, battling internally between methodological and
policy considerations, which at times pull in opposite directions.

